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A Consumer Self-Defense Perspective on
Electricity Markets
John C. Hilke, Ph.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Much has been said and written about market power problems in
United States electricity markets and about how policy makers should
protect consumers from the exercise of market power and marketing
abuses.' I do not disagree.
What I would like to emphasize, however, is a slightly different
perspective on helping consumers. In particular, I urge policy makers to
emphasize giving consumers the tools to help protect themselves. This
does not mean abandoning other economically appropriate efforts to
mitigate suppliers' market power-it does mean giving weight to
consumer self-defense arguments for or against various potential market
power remedies.
Many of the potential consumer self-defense tools work because
they
increase the price sensitivity of demand for electric power, making it
less profitable for incumbent suppliers to raise prices anticompetitively.
An added kicker in electric power markets is that increasing the price
sensitivity of demand for electric power provides benefits beyond
curtailing market power. In the short run, increased price sensitivity of
demand is likely to increase reliability because prices, rather than
blackouts, keep supply and demand balanced. In the longer run, a
system with greater price sensitivity will have lower average production
costs because the load profile will be less variable. This allows a larger

* Electricity Project Coordinator, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. This
article presents the personal views of the author. It does not purport to represent the views of the
Federal Trade Commission or of any individual Commissioner.
1. Market power of a seller is defined as the ability of one or more suppliers to raise prices for
a product above the competitive level for an extended period of time. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1 (revised Apr. 8, 1997)

[hereinafter DOJ/FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. Unilateral market power occurs
when a single supplier has market power. Id. Coordinated interaction involves exercise of
market power by a group of suppliers. Id.
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portion of total load to be served by base-load plants with low average
costs and a smaller portion of load to be served by peaking plants with
high average costs.
One problem with the approach of trying to do everything for the
consumers is that there are relatively few shepherds and a lot of clever
wolves out there. The shepherd's job becomes a lot easier if the sheep
bite back frequently.
I also think that the consumer self-defense perspective can help cut
through arguments that state and federal efforts to stem market power in
electricity markets simply reflect government imposing its arbitrary
judgments about market operations.
In casting about for ways to allow consumers to help protect
themselves in electricity markets, I suggest that we do not need to
"reinvent the wheel." Rather, we should start by examining: (1) how
consumers protect themselves in other markets, and (2) what parallel
approaches for consumer self-protection can work in electricity markets.
II. CONDITIONS GENERALLY HELPING CONSUMERS TO DEFEND
THEMSELVES AGAINST MARKET POWER THAT ARE SUGGESTED BY THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
When antitrust investigators look at the ability of consumers to
constrain the market power of suppliers, they conclude that market
power is less likely to be a problem:
1. if there are several suppliers;
2. if consumers have accurate and timely price information;
3. if consumers can quickly and easily switch suppliers;
4. if consumers-practicably-can "make" instead of buy the
product;
5. if inventories are available to supplement current production
when prices are high; and
6. if long-term and short-term supply agreements are available to
buyers.
This undoubtedly is not an exhaustive list, but I believe it captures
many of the high points relating to consumer self-protection that are
2
implicit in the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

2. See DOJ/FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1 (stating that the analysis is
"focused on whether consumers ... 'likely would' take certain actions, that is, whether the action
is in the actor's economic interest").
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Regarding the number of suppliers, the basic concept is that when
consumers have a choice amongst several suppliers, it is more difficult
for one or a few suppliers to raise prices above competitive levels and
easier for an individual consumer to find a close match between the
product variations offered and his or her preferences.
Regarding timely and accurate prices, the core idea is that consumers
need timely and accurate price information in order to make informed
economic decisions about consumption and about investments
associated with consumption.
Regarding rapid and low-cost switching, the observation is that
consumer responses to price increases will be larger and swifter if
transaction costs associated with switching between suppliers are low.
Regarding practicable availability of a make-it-yourself option, the
insight is that when consumers can readily become suppliers
themselves, markets may come close to being contestable in the
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 3 sense of the term.
Regarding inventories, the logic is that just as inventories buffer
demand and supply shocks due to natural disasters, so too do
inventories buffer supply shocks due to suppliers' efforts to raise prices
by restricting output.
Regarding long-term and short-term contracts, the theory is that
variations in the duration of supply contracts make it possible for
consumers to hedge against future price volatility, including future
efforts of suppliers to exercise market power. Differing supply
contracts also can create divergence in the interests of suppliers that
may disrupt efforts to coordinate price increases among suppliers.
III. ELECTRICITY APPLICATIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AIDING
CONSUMER SELF-DEFENSE

I turn now to the electricity market applications of each of these
conditions that can help constrain supplier market power through
consumer self-protection.
A. Several Suppliers
Within the context of a state retail choice program, there are many
factors affecting the number of viable suppliers. They include legal

3. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 5 (1982) (defining a "perfectly
contestable" market as accessible to potential entrants, free of entry barriers, and where entry
profitability is evaluated at the pre-entry prices of incumbent firms).
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exclusions, high registration costs and fees, and high administrative
costs for suppliers. I will assume for the purpose of discussion that
these potential impediments are not at issue. If they are not, then the
basic problem for potential suppliers principally involves obtaining
power to supply to consumers. One of the chief ways to assure that
many suppliers can solve this problem is to reduce transmission
constraints, transmission discrimination, and rate pancaking. 4 Doing all
three can increase the geographic scope of the market and bring in more
effective generation competitors. I think that the consumer selfprotection perspective is particularly helpful, for example, in thinking
about the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) efforts to
establish large regional transmission organizations (RTOs).5
B. Timely andAccurate Prices
As the 2001 FTC Staff Report on retail electricity competition
pointed out, most consumers do not have the information necessary to
make good economic consumption and investment decisions regarding
electric power. 6 This is due primarily to the common regulatory
practice of averaging electricity prices over several months (or years)
rather than charging real-time retail prices that reflect changes in realtime wholesale electricity prices. We describe a market that is lacking7
demand-side responsiveness as "the sound of one hand clapping.
Denying consumers the ability and incentive to shave demand when
wholesale prices are high-creates reliability problems for the whole
electricity system and exacerbates wholesale price volatility. It also
encourages consumers to disregard the costs they impose on other
consumers in their pattern of consumption. While it is true that
introducing real-time prices will involve some costs, it seems
appropriate at this point in time to look at the detailed costs and benefits
of real-time retail electricity pricing and metering. I note that a recent

4. See, e.g., JOHN C. HILKE ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF, COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCuS
ON RETAIL COMPETITION ch. II, at 13-31 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
electrictyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT] (discussing effective operation and
expansion of the transmission grid).
5. FERC Order 2000 established the framework for the ongoing RTO formation process. See
Regional Transmission Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,390 (1999) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35) (proposed June 10, 1999), issued as FERC Order No. 2000, 89 FERC T 61,285 (1999).
6. See 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, ch. IV, at 50 n.30 ("Average pricing generally
masks price signals that consumers need inorder to make economic consumption and investment
decisions.").
7. Id. at ch. III, at 33-41.
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edition of an electric power industry journal contains some encouraging
8
information on the costs and effectiveness of real-time metering.
C. Quick, Low-Cost Switching
Many discussions of switching costs focus on issues such as wet
signature requirements, alternative verification systems, and penalties
for slamming. 9 I agree that each of these is important, however, I also
think it is important to look beyond the existing system in which a
consumer picks one supplier to buy from over an extended period.
Going forward, it seems unnecessary to require such a one supplier to
each customer system. As computer systems advance, it seems quite
reasonable to expect that consumers might pick several potential
suppliers and then buy from whichever one offers the lowest price or
greatest reliability or greenest product at any point in time. I hope that
various state retail regimes will prove flexible enough to accommodate
the multiple potential supplier approach. I note that some industrial
customers with connections to multiple natural gas pipelines already
have this freedom of choice. Computer software capable of handling at
least two electric suppliers serving the same customer at different times
of the day has been developed already. Perhaps ironically, one 0firm
active in developing this type of software has been Otter Tail Power.1
D. "Make" or "Buy" Optionsfor Retail Electricity Consumers
Some of the most exciting news in electricity markets these days
comes from the rapid technical advances in distributed generation that
are just now hitting the market. For those of you not already familiar

8. See, e.g., Carl Levesque, Real-Time Metering: Still as Sweet with Prices Controlled?, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Sept. 1, 2001, at 12, 16-18, available at 2001 WL 10544767 (noting two studies that
reached similar conclusions, suggesting that real-time pricing may save 2000 megawatts off peak
loads).
9. A wet signature requirement invalidates a switch between suppliers that is not accompanied
by the customer's signed switching request. Alternative means to verify a switching request
include, for example, a recorded phone conversation with the consumer or an e-mail from the
consumer. A variety of penalties for slamming have been proposed. These range, for example,
from financial planning to terminating the license of the supplier if intentional slamming is
verified.
10. Otter Tail Power Co. was the subject of a well known 1973 Supreme Court decision, Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), in which the court ruled that Otter Tail's
refusal to transmit power from other generators to independent municipal distribution systems
within its transmission territory constituted an illegal attempt to monopolize under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. The irony is that the software that Otter Tail Power has recently helped to
develop would facilitate switching between multiple alternative generators. This is a step beyond
the switching to a single alternative generator that the company opposed so vigorously in earlier
years.
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with these developments, I encourage you to read the recent CECA
report on distributed generation and other distributed resources." Fuel
cells and microturbines lead the list of innovations in this area.
From an economic perspective, diffusion of distributed generation
increases elasticity of demand making anticompetitive price increases
less profitable for incumbent suppliers. When distributed generation
capacity is allowed to supply the grid (as well as to reduce an individual
consumer's demand from the grid), diffusion of distributed generation
also will increase the number and variety of suppliers in ways that may
help frustrate pricing coordination among incumbent suppliers.
There are important issues here regarding pricing of back up supply
services, grid connections, and pricing for power supplied to the grid by
on-site generators. Certain policy decisions on any of these issues could
severely delay or cripple diffusion of distributed generation. As policy
makers consider these issues, the idea that distributed generation is a
form of consumer self-protection against market power may help
smooth the path for advance of these emerging technologies.
E. Electricity Inventories
One of the biggest distinctions between electricity markets and other
markets has been the inability to economically store electric energy in
large quantities. This is gradually changing as energy storage
technologies, many of them designed for home use, develop.
Development and use of energy storage technologies would have an
effect similar to distributed generation-that is, making demand more
price sensitive. Both development and deployment of energy storage
devices by consumers may be highly dependent on accurate and timely
retail pricing of electric power. Energy storage devices are essentially a
method for consumers to shift demand from high-price periods to lowprice periods. This allows consumers to consume electric power during
peak demand periods without requiring as much power from the grid
during these periods of high wholesale prices. Again, policy makers
may find it easier to consider real-time pricing of electric power
realizing that such pricing will give consumers incentives to welcome
electric storage devices that inventory energy and allow consumers to
reduce their total electricity bills.

11. THE CONSUMER ENERGY COUNCIL OF AMERICA DISTRIBUTED ENERGY DOMESTIC
FORUM, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY: TOWARDS A 21 ST CENTURY INFRASTRUCTURE I-XIII (2001).
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F. Long-term and Short-term Supply Agreements

The rationale for why variable durations of supply contracts help to
undermine coordination of pricing among suppliers applies equally well
to electric power markets as it does to other markets. There is also a
strong consumer choice argument for variable length contracts. This
argument starts with the premise that consumers have different
preferences for risk, but that the existing system, in which all consumers
in a given class pay the same price based on the yearly costs of a single
supplier, imposes a specific level of risk on all consumers regardless of
their preferences. The alternative in which each consumer elects how
much risk they want to face by picking a supply contract that meets
their risk preferences allows consumers to make a better match with
their preferences. Some consumers will undoubtedly want to stick with
a "fixed-rate-for-a-year plan," while others may want real-time prices
and others may pick a contract with a longer price guarantee.
IV. CONCLUSION

While there is a growing consensus about many remedies for market
power problems in electricity markets, taking a consumer self-defense
perspective on some of these remedies is likely to help policy makers
understand and accept important policy options including large RTOs,
demand-side participation in electricity markets, real-time pricing, and
new distributed resource technologies. Frankly, it seems to me to be
high time to "arm" consumers for self-defense in these ways regardless
of the regulatory regime in place in a state. Within an existing
consumer choice program, such changes are likely to help curtail
suppliers' market power and increase system efficiency. In a fully
regulated retail system, developing multiple consumer service options is
likely to improve system efficiency, better match consumer preferences,
and raise consumer awareness that electric power services can come in
"flavors" other than vanilla.

